1. Until the 1993 Kono Statement

Shoji Motooka, the former Vice Chairman of the House of Councilors, whom I had long admired and trusted as a leader in human rights advocacy, passed away unexpectedly on April 10, 2017. The initial phase of his parliamentary activism can be traced back to his involvement in policy initiatives on international human rights law in the early 1980s. This coincided with my own endeavors in the said field, establishing a cooperative relationship. Without considering this history,¹ it is difficult to fully grasp the trajectory of Councilor Motooka’s subsequent parliamentary activities.

Councilor Motooka’s involvement in the “Comfort Women” issue began with the following events. On June 6, 1990, he raised a question on behalf of the Social Democratic Party during the House of Councilors Budget Committee. Regarding the forced mobilization of Koreans, he inquired, “Is it true that some were taken as wartime “Comfort Women” during the forced internment?”² In response, Tsutao Shimizu, the Director of Occupational Security at the Ministry of Labor, stated, “When it comes to the issue of the Japanese military “Comfort Women”, if we take into account various testimonies from older individuals and similar sources, it appears that private entities were involved in recruiting these individuals alongside the military. Honestly speaking, it would be challenging to conduct an investigation and reach definitive conclusions about such circumstances.” He dismissed the issue as a private business and asserted that it did not involve the government, thereby concluding that it was not subject to investigation.

Councilor Motooka strongly confronted Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, expressing doubts about the possibility of establishing genuine trust between Japan and Korea without clarifying the situation. Eventually, he received an assurance from Prime Minister Kaifu that “the government would promptly report on the matter” and awaited the results of the investigation. Upon learning about the content of the parliamentary inquiry, a Korean women’s organization vehemently protested, declaring, “The Japanese government is lying. The military had indeed been involved.” Kim Hak-sun, who had been forcefully coerced into becoming a “Comfort Woman,” stated that she could not peacefully close her eyes under these circumstances and voluntarily filed a lawsuit in August 1991, seeking restoration of honor and compensation from the Japanese government.

Amidst these developments, in January 1992, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi apologized, acknowledging the involvement of the Japanese military in the “Comfort Women” issue during a session in the Korean National Assembly. In response to Councilor Motooka’s fierce questioning, the Cabinet Councilor’ Office on External Affairs released the results of the investigation on August 4, 1993, titled “Regarding the Issue of “Comfort Women” during the War.” Based on these findings, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei delivered a speech,³ acknowledging the direct or indirect involvement of the Japanese military in the establishment of “comfort stations.” Furthermore, he recognized that while private brokers were primarily responsible for recruiting “Comfort Women,” many cases involved coercion or deception, disregarding the will of the individuals. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono also acknowledged instances of direct involvement by military personnel and the immense suffering endured by the “Comfort Women” under coercive circumstances, extending an apology to the victims.

2. Motooka’s Turbulent Legislative Movement from 1994 to 2000

As the leading advocate of the Socialist Party’s “Comfort Women” issue, Councilor Motooka pursued a legislative solution through parliamentary compensation. However, the Japanese government consistently argued that “parliamentary compensation is not possible,” citing the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1965 Korea-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement as having already resolved the matter. In an attempt to evade its legal responsibility, the Japanese government established the “Asian Women’s Fund (AWF)” and initiated a private fundraising campaign to provide compensation to the victims on behalf of the state.

Councilor Motooka supported the victims’ claim that the apology lacked sincerity, viewing it as fundamentally flawed. Without a change in the Japanese government’s approach to addressing the “Comfort Women” issue, no further progress could be expected. The only way forward is through the deliberation and approval of a new bill in the National Diet, which would facilitate a resolution to the “Comfort Women” issue that the victims can genuinely acknowledge and accept as a sincere apology.

Councilor Motooka drafted a “Bill on the Establishment of Investigative Council on the Issue of Wartime Sexual Coercion” as a legislative bill, meticulously conducting procedures to ensure prior confirmation of support and acceptance from victims from various countries, including South Korea, should it be enacted as an apology.⁶ Furthermore, in 2000, he successfully persuaded the shadow cabinet of the Democratic Party, led by Yukio Hatoyama, to consistently submit the bill as a joint effort among opposition parties. The passage of this bill was expected to significantly expedite the resolution of the “Comfort Women” issue. Referred to as the “Motooka Bill,” this bill was presented to the parliament 10 times as a joint opposition bill, serving as a significant historical testament to the dedicated efforts of numerous Japanese lawmakers in their pursuit of an apology. However, it was truly regrettable that this bill failed to become law due to insufficient media attention and the opposition faced by the Liberal Democratic Party and the Public Democratic Party.

Kim Hak-sun directly pleaded with Councilor Motooka, tearfully expressing, “Mr. Motooka, as a member of the National Diet, you hold a position of influence. Since Japanese lawmakers have failed to address the issue, we have made a firm decision to seek recourse through the court.” Even after retiring from politics in 2004, Councilor Motooka established the “International Human Rights Law Policy Institute” and remained dedicated to advancing the bill and pursuing a legal resolution to the “Comfort Women” issue based on the responsibility of the state. The driving force behind Councilor Motooka’s unwavering dedication and continued struggle is greatly attributed to Kim Hak-sun’s heartfelt appeal.

3. Japanese Government Ignoring UN Recommendations

I actively engaged in campaigns and conducted legal research at the United Nations in support of Councilor Motooka’s parliamentary movement on the “Comfort Women” issue. This involvement commenced on February 17, 1992, when I addressed the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR), representing the UN NGO International Educational Development (IED). During the speech, I asserted that “the Japanese military “Comfort Women” were victims of sexual slavery” and called for UN intervention to facilitate dialogue between Japan and the victims.⁷ This undertaking was voluntary⁸ and not prompted by any specific request from the Korean people. As previously mentioned, it was part of my ongoing efforts since 1984, utilizing human rights mechanisms under the UN Charter. My remarks at the CHR in February 1992 had a profound impact compared to my previous UN statements, laying the groundwork for my subsequent activities within the UN.

In subsequent years, efforts were made to establish an alternative and effective avenue for providing redress to the Japanese military “Comfort Women” victims outside the jurisdiction of Japanese domestic courts, utilizing the procedures outlined in the UN Charter. During the UN review process, two viable paths for effective redress⁹ were identified. In 1994, on behalf of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR), I submitted information regarding the procedures of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to the United Nations Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery. This included that “the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration could serve as a platform for resolving disputes between the state and individual victims, such as those related to Japanese military “Comfort Women” issue and that if requested by the victims, the Japanese government should consent to settle disputes through the Permanent Court of Arbitration.”¹⁰

On January 24, 1995, the Japanese government formally responded to the defense team’s request, made on behalf of the victims, to resolve the “Comfort Women” issue through international arbitration. Its response was an outright rejection, claiming that the matter had already been “resolved by treaties” without providing any reasonable justification. However, whether or not the issue was genuinely resolved by treaties is a legal matter that should be addressed through arbitration, and therefore, it cannot be considered a valid reason for refusal. It was the Japanese government that employed the discredited “defenses based on treaties” as a pretext to impede the implementation of the UN recommendation.

In August 1995, the UN Human Rights Subcommittee pointedly identified Japan for the first time regarding the issue of “Comfort Women” (including practice similar to slavery). The Subcommittee criticized the Japanese government’s privately-funded measures as “inadequate.” It called for the establishment of an “administrative review agency” to address the problem and also suggested utilizing international arbitration, as previously recommended by the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery in 1994, as a potential solution for resolving the issue.¹¹

The legislation was necessary to fulfill the UN recommendation calling for the establishment of an “administrative review agency.” However, the support movement for the “Comfort Women” in Japan became divided, and the momentum for the legislative movement weakened following the implementation of the AWF policy. The Murayama administration, a three-party coalition consisting of the Liberal Democratic Party, Socialist Party, and New Party Sakigake, reached an agreement affirming that “national compensation is impossible.” Consequently, the Federations of Labor Unions, with the All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers’ Union at the forefront, which had previously supported the Murayama administration, withdrew their support for the legislative resolution policy. I endeavored to address the legal challenges through examination in order to demonstrate the fallacy of the argument against legislative resolution, which claimed that “legislative resolution constitutes a violation of treaties as well as the Constitution, and therefore achieving a legislative settlement is impossible.”¹²

All things considered, Japan must bear responsibility as a nation. To reignite the movement, a civic movement aimed at achieving legislative resolution was needed. In December 1996, the “Gathering for Legislative Resolution of the “Comfort Women” Issue” was established, with Attorney Tsuchiya Koken as the Chairman, Professor Arai Shinichi from Surugadai University as the Vice Chairman, and Arimitsu Ken serving as the Secretariat Liaison.

Footnotes

1. See 本岡昭次, 中大路為弘編著, 世界がみつめる日本の人権: これからは人権の時代です, 新泉社, 1991.
2. For parliamentary questions regarding the “Comfort Women” issue, including this inquiry, see 本岡昭次, ‘慰安婦’問題と私の国会審議, 本岡昭次東京事務所, 2002.
3. Kono Cabinet Chief Cabinet Secretary Discussion on the Announcement of the Results of the Investigation into “Comfort Women” (August 4, 1993), Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/kono.html. accessed June 11, 2023.
4. Report of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Mission of Inquiry, Dolgopol and Paranjape, “Comfort Women an unfinished ordeal: Report of a Mission,” ICJ, 1994, pp.1-205.
5. 日本弁護士連合会, “‘従軍慰安婦問題’に関する提言,” 同連合会編, “問われる女性の人権,” こうち書房, 1996, pp. 97-134.
6. See the paper 国際人権法政策研究 第３巻第４巻合併号(通算第４号) published in 2008. Pay particular attention to 本岡昭次 “慰安婦問題と私の国会追及13年” and 戸塚悦朗 “市民が決める慰安婦問題の立法解決ーー戦時性的強制被害者問題解決促進法案の実現を求めてーー”.
7. I have personally undertaken the task of addressing the issue by utilizing the Right of Individual Communication of the CHR. Each year, I raise the issue of significant human rights violations related to Japan with the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. In 1992, the focus of concern was the Japanese military “Comfort Women” issue. 
8. See 木村幹, “慰安婦問題の国際化の一側面：戸塚悦朗の回顧を中心に,” 国際協力研究 29巻1号(2021.7), pp. 111-147.
9. It was the report of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Mission of Inquiry (Dolgopol and Paranjape, “Comfort Women an unfinished ordeal: Report of a Mission” ICJ, 1994, pp.1-205.) that suggested this path to resolution to UN human rights bodies. For a detailed account, see 戸塚悦朗, 普及版日本が知らない戦争責任, 現代人文社, 2008, etc.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., Chapter 5, pp. 141-148.
12. See ibid. The failure of the “defenses based on treaties” is evident from the ICJ report, the recommendations of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations, the UN Coomaraswamy report, and the McDougall report. My research is 戸塚悦朗, “国際法から見た日本軍性奴隷問題,” 岩波講座現代の法11: ジェンダーと法, 岩波書店, August 1997, pp. 313-337. Recently, as a result of collaborative international research on the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Beyond the San Francisco System – Seeking a Peace Regime in East Asia (written by Kim Young-ho and others, Medici Media) was published in Korea in 2022, and was selected as one of the ten books of the year by The Hankyoreh Newspaper. [2022 Hankyoreh “Book of the Year”] https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/book/1072853.html, accessed May 19, 2023. See Totsuka’s paper published in the same book. 
 

The contents of Kono statement can also be found in Archives 814 collection of Research Institution on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery.   https://www.archive814.or.kr/collection/collectionDetail.do?collectionId=29