To build responsible dialogue between the two countries to clarify the truth

How to resolve the Korea-Japan relationship surrounding the Japanese military “comfort women” issue.

Q. On January 2018, Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha announced that “the government would exert all efforts to carry out its mandate necessary to recover the honor and dignity and to heal the wounded hearts of the comfort women victims.” At the same time, she drew a line by saying that “we will not demand a renegotiation from the Japanese government, considering the fact that we cannot deny the 2015 Agreement was an official agreement between the two countries.” The Moon Jae-in administration then set about the process of dissolving the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation, but it did not go as far as negating the existence of the December 28 agreement. Then, in what way can the issue of “comfort women” be resolved between Korea and Japan surrounding this agreement?
 

Cho Sihyeon

The Moon Jae-in administration does not negate the 2015 Agreement. It wants to incapacitate the Agreement, while acknowledging the existence of it. Until now, it has simply been dismantling the outcome of the agreement, without coming up with a realistic results. It has yet to provide a specific proposal on the best way to steer this problem.
 

Cho Yanghyeon

I agree with the argument that we should try to resolve this issue by adjusting the level of demands while as many “comfort women” victims as possible are still alive, because it’d be difficult to attain the most ideal result. The challenge is, what if the situation isn’t improving due to procedural issues or Japan’s insincerity, then what is the alternative? This part is inadequate. If it’s difficult to get Japan to cooperate, we may choose the method of the Kim Young-sam administration – to support the victims with our own funds, based on our moral compass. Of course, a lot of problems exist with this method, but once such policy is presented to the people, they would realize and understand ‘oh, this is the government’s position.’ However, the government plan for this aspect is still ambiguous. This leads to the criticism; what is the alternative if the Agreement is not the answer?

Cho Sihyeon

As related to the alternative proposal, the implication and impact of the agreement on the victims are being dealt with by the mechanism of international human rights. According to the international standards for human rights, the standard for the victim’s rights are well established and there are special rapporteur and organizations on the past important human rights violations. The victims have the rights, which can be summarized into the following 4 types: rights to the truth, rights on justice, rights for compensation and the rights on the prevention of a recurrence. The “comfort women” issue has been discussed at the UN from the start and I think it contributed significantly to establishing a standard that can be applied universally to the human rights situations worldwide. From that aspect, I think the Korean government, according to the UN standard, must seriously consider how to prepare an alternative proposal and establish a policy for this issue. Only then, Korea’s standpoint could be persuaded in the international community.
 

Nam Kijeong

To expand the discussion, I want to say that there is a way to complete the agreement with a third option. An agreement is in place, but it is incomplete. This means that a way to complete it is indeed within the agreement. You talked of the rights to the truth, justice, compensation and the prevention of recurrence. There are languages about “recovering the honor and healing the wounds” in the agreement, and of taking measures for such an end. So, I think we need to skillfully utilize the document. We need to continuously demand efforts to seek the truth, justice, compensation and the prevention of recurrence to Japan. Every time Japan makes a statement like ‘all we lost is 1 billion Yen’ or something similar, we need to keep demanding an explanation for such a statement. We need to keep raising the point that these statements violate the promises of taking measures to recover the honor of the victims and heal the wounds, and continue our demands for Japan to complete the agreement. In this way, we have to make the agreement meaningful. We need to make every effort to turn the wrong agreement into a proper agreement.

As Mr. Cho Si-hyeon mentioned earlier, this is the point that contradicts the 1965 Agreement. I think we should persistently focus on the weaknesses of the 1965 Agreement using this point. I believe it is the task we must undertake to entirely break the limits of the 1965 system. I think the agreement has the elements we can utilize as a leverage for this task. One thing to clarify is that it’s not to Park Geun-hye administration’s credit that such elements were included in the Agreement. Instead, it was the fruit of the tenacious activism of the “comfort women” survivors and the civic groups that persisted on principle. The problem is the unnecessary clauses added by the Park Geun-hye administration. Since the elements included in the front portion represent the outcome of the civil movement so far, I believe we should affirm these elements and make them the foundation of our movement going forward.
 

Cho Yanghyeon

I think the role of the media is important as well. The media at the time raised a lot of issues on the inadequacies and negative aspects of the “comfort women” agreement within Korea. However, Japan approached this with a more prudent tone than we did. Regardless of ideological tendencies, I think we needed to approach it from the diplomatic point of view, in terms of national interest. I got the impression that the pressure felt by Japan was weakened as it became an (internal) political issue in Korea.

Hoping for responsible dialogue between the two countries to clarify the truth

Cho Sihyeon

There is a saying that ‘a winner refuses to yield.’ Japan talked of an impossibility (irreversible resolution). A resolution is a demand for actions to resolve the issue, not a certain status; it is a ‘process.’ It means there will be people who will think and learn about this issue 100 years later. In that sense, it’s preposterous because this Agreement says it resolved something impossible to resolve. However, the Japanese government induced the (Korean) government, on behalf of the victims, to say “it’s over,” Japan won’t want to give up this advantageous position easily.

This is why it is important to elect the president well. We need to be careful because a state can be bound forever due to the people who make promises easily. The Abe administration speaks ill of Korea as a country that does not keep its promises; the Korean government must respond by making more active defenses. Also, it is necessary to implement a flexible diplomacy by making Japan liable for not responding to any dialogue on this issue. At the same time, it is worthy to wait patiently based on the international standards and principles.

An agreement is a promise between two countries to perform joint actions to accomplish a common purpose. Then, the two countries must share the common perception of the issue – do they? Korea and Japan both have their own agenda and it was the same for the 1965 Agreement as well. Both countries have interpreted the 1965 Agreement to their taste, misleading their own people to some extent. Likewise, the 2015 Agreement on "comfort women" may have similar aspects. Then, how can we narrow the gap in perception between Korea and Japan? It is urgent to begin a responsible dialogue for this matter between the two countries.
 

Nam Kijeong

I agree with you in the large scheme, but I would like to add a few more words. We have to choose a good leader. It is essential to elect a good leader but we sometimes make mistakes. There are times when we elect the wrong person. However, a country with this level of mature democracy can be sustained with the system, and when a leader and the government make mistakes, then the people can overcome them. In that regard, the government created by the power of the people needs to think specifically about how to overcome the unsuitable agreement from the past.

Moreover, it cannot be ‘resolved,’ of course. As long as movements exist, there always will be new issues, and some issues deemed resolved will turn out to have been unresolved, after all. However, the level of resolution will go up, even slightly, as long as there is political will to accept the issues raised by the civic society. The level of resolution is verified and maintained when it’s prescribed in the law, but it’ll become inadequate at some point, then, the movement will start again, and it’ll be accepted in the politics to resolve the issue. In that regard, it is given that there is no such thing as a complete ‘resolution’ of an issue, but I think it is necessary to pinpoint the level of resolution ascertained through agreements.

The 2015 Agreement says that the “comfort women” issue occurred ‘with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time.’ However, the issue of Japanese military “comfort women” pertains to a lot more than just the involvement of the military. For example, if it becomes clear that the Japanese government was directly involved in the Japanese military “comfort women” issue, then the premise of the 2015 Agreement must change. Also, if it is confirmed that the Allied Forces were involved in reducing or concealing the “comfort women” issue, then the premise of the Agreement will be shaken, and the level of resolution will need to change as well. Therefore, we need to research and unearth the truth so that the “comfort women” issue can be discussed under a larger framework. Only then can we raise the point that a more advanced resolution is necessary. That is why it is necessary to make the efforts and research to reveal the truth.
 

Cho Yanghyeon

If we were to continue our discussion from the previous points, it’ll cause considerable pain. In fact, the “comfort women” issue is larger than the scope the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can handle. There are many different elements each department of the government can engage in, and the issue itself is multi-faceted. Moreover, besides the administration, there may be judgements rendered from the judicial branch, and all these other factors, such as the NGO groups, the victims and the people’s sentiment also must be considered – therefore, this is not an issue that can be directed and led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs only. However, as the “comfort women” issue and the issues on the victims of forced labor are positioned heavily in the Korea-Japan relations, other issues cannot advance easily. This is one of the biggest reasons why some say that there is no diplomatic policy towards Japan in Korea’s foreign policy.

The matter comes down to how to deal with each stakeholder under the circumstances, and there isn’t much I can do even if I were a foreign minister. However, that does not mean that there is absolutely nothing that can be done. First of all, if the 2015 Agreement did not represent the Korean people’s sentiment, a judgement must be made as to what to do to properly represent it. A concrete position should be in place for the future diplomatic policy against Japan based on the correct perception of Japan.

Some people mention the joint statement for the Korea-Japan partnership during the Kim Dae-jung administration; the difference between then and now is that there was diplomacy at that time. The relationship with the U.S. and China was also important, not only Japan. Kim Dae-jung administration pursued a North Korea policy while establishing these foreign relations, so the history-related issues were part of the large picture. However, now, the comprehensive scheme is being overlooked, while all these issues – the history issue, North Korea issue, the U.S. issue and the China issue – are being handled separately, although they are all organically interconnected. Based on this understanding, we need to make decisions on how to view Japan and what strategic value it has for us.

Japan is a neighboring country. Also, when it comes to the security and the economy, we can’t afford to do without Japan, and vice versa. What remains unchanged is the fact that this is a special relationship. In that case, there must be a decision on how to resolve this transitional situation on the past history-related issues, and we may utilize a diplomatic working group. This may be too strong a criticism, but I do not think we can take a single step forward without it.
 

Nam Kijeong

Korea-Japan relations remain a very important bilateral relationship. However, I think it is time to reimagine and plan Korea-Japan relations that are different from the past. So many other circumstances arose that the Korea-Japan relations can’t move forward just based on the security issues. It is no longer possible to improve or recover the Korea-Japan relations as a subordinate alliance in the security triangle between Korea-Japan-US. I don’t think we can go back to the previous relationship now since the peace process on the Korean Peninsula has begun, and the ruling from the Supreme Court came out last year. I think the goal should be re-building of Korea-Japan relations, instead of improving the Korea-Japan relations. That is to say Japan should be included in the North-South relations based on the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, to create a peace triangle with South Korea-North Korea-Japan, and the Korea-Japan relations should be designed as the foundation to support such a triangle.

In one-track method, the train in the back cannot move forward when historical problems block it in the front. The history track and future track must move forward simultaneously. The Korea-Japan relations should be redesigned in a new diplomatic manner to create peace, and to put history on top of that peace, instead of the past Korea-Japan model where Korea would cost history to buy security. In that respect, I would like to strongly assert that re-establishing the Korea-Japan relations should be synchronized with the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, while solving the historical issues between Korea and Japan, and leading the North-South Korean relations from cease-fire to peace.
 

How should we view and understand Japan?

Q. You have talked about what is regrettable about our government in the “comfort women” issue and the Korea-Japan relations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese government is even more frustrating. The Abe administration is currently pursuing historical revisionism, denying the past history-related issues. However, not everyone in Japan must be historical revisionists, like Abe. Is there a possibility of an alternative trend occurring within Japan?
 

Nam Kijeong

In that sense, I hope the Korean perspective on Japan to become much more precise. Since the pacifists and the so-called traditional nationalists are the powers that move Japan currently, it may seem like Japan is moving away from pacifism towards traditional nationalism. Indeed, underneath it, there are people who seek liberalistic order and political realists. I think the mainstream in Japan is being formed by the antagonism among these people.

Japan’s political realists want to raise the status of Japan in the world of power politics by amending its constitution, but cannot move forwards due to the pacifist constitution*. So, in Japan’s political landscape, we can still find liberals, or what I call systematic liberalists, who maintain steady power. Japan cannot conduct unilateral diplomacy based on military power due to its pacifist constitution. Therefore, they consider the system and regime to be very important. This has resulted in the culture of valuing promises in Japan. This is not only because Japan traditionally considered the rules and promises to be important but also because of the international status faced by Japan after the war.

This also applies to the “comfort women” issue. I think it is possible to make a matrix with 2 axes on this issue: the first axis is on whether there is such a thing as “comfort women” or not; the second axis is on how to deal with the 2015 Agreement on the “comfort women.” To us, it looks like following two groups are at odds with each other: (1) one is the civic groups in Japan that believe the “comfort women” issue exists and the 2015 Agreement on “comfort women” is wrong, and (2) the other is a group that believes that the “comfort women” issues has never existed, so it is wrong to make the agreement. However, within Japan these two groups are small in size. The real group that moves Japan is (3) the group that believes the “comfort women” issue does not exist, but Japan just needs to make an agreement for the sake of security cooperation among Korea-US-Japan, because that’s what the U.S. is asking and Korea is persistently raising the issue. Abe and the people surrounding him are in this group who deny any aspect of the “comfort women” issue, so they continue to make absurd remarks.

Meanwhile, there is another group (4) who believes the “comfort women” issue is important, and the agreement was made with sincerity. These are the systematic liberalists, and they want to maintain the agreement as it does exist. However, if we were to annul the agreement, then these systematic liberalists would resist and end up siding with Abe. I find this to be very unfortunate, and in response to this, we need to consider diplomacy in relation to this landscape of Japan.

Cho Yanghyeon

I believe it is correct to say that Japan’s awareness of the past history is regressive. It is related to the erosion on the pluralistic values as Abe has stayed in power for a long time. Under these circumstances, ‘value’ is the keyword we can use to fight the frame of the Japanese government. Japan has long criticized China based on the “value alliance” with the US – stating that China is a totalitarian and undemocratic society. The values the Japanese government demand to the Chinese government would be freedom, human rights, peace, etc., no? Thus, the Korean government can demand the same to the Japanese government. If we were to be in an advantageous position in the frame war, I think we need to create an alliance based on universal values.
 

Nam Kijeong

To supplement, I think talking to Japan about the universal value of peace would be effective. There are aspects of Japan that are commendable in terms pacifist development after the war. There is the pacifist constitution, as well as the Korea-Japan Joint Declaration of 1998. Therefore, it is important to persuade Japan that ‘Japan has a role to play to bring peace, and Japan needs to be more actively involved in the peace process on the Korean Peninsula.’ We can also propose to resolve the history issue together during the process.
 

Cho Yanghyeon

I fully agree with your opinion. The frame of the Abe administration is extremely two-faced. They talk about human rights and democracy to North Korea, but refuse to emphasize with the values demanded by the Korean government. This is highly double-faced. If they were to talk about human rights with any consistency, the Japanese government must play an active role in resolving the “comfort women” issue, the issue of the wartime sexual violence against women. However, they continues to change the value system, depending on whom they’re talking to. It is an extremely vulnerable structure to discuss a slightly more universal value system. If Korea and Japan cannot share the value system, what is the country Japan can share its values with? Is it South-East Asia? India? No. After all, there is no other country Japan can share their value system with most closely than Korea. Therefore, we should be able to raise issues such as democracy, human rights, peace and economics to the Abe administration in the larger frame of universal values.

Cho Sihyeon

As Korea exerts more efforts to resolve the “comfort women” issue, Japan is turning more to the right. It is paradoxical. Therefore, I think a more strategic approach is necessary, as you two have mentioned. In that respect, we need to analyze the relationship of power more closely. I tend to become timid when it comes to talk about these things because I am close to the civic organizations, but I must point out that the two of you have presented them well. Thank you.

Q. We need to wrap up now. Civic organizations within Korea and Japan must continue to point out the issues and raise their voices in order to resolve the Japanese military “comfort women” issue. Also, the governments of the two countries must play the roles that only governments can play. Only then, Korea-Japan relations will be able to overcome conflicts and move forward. Thank you for your in-depth discussion on this difficult topic for around 2 hours. We will now conclude the discussion and thank you once again for your time.

Nam Kijeong 

Thank you for your time.

Cho Yanghyeon 

Thank you for this opportunity.

Cho Sihyeon 

It has been an incredibly meaningful discussion. I hope to have more opportunities like this in the future.