For “Comfort Women” Litigation with Global Citizens and Future Generations!

“The Legal Struggle over the Japanese Military ‘Comfort Women’ Issue and the ‘Comfort Women’ Movement” (2)

🧶 Ryu Gwang-ok : Litigation inevitably has its limits, as it ultimately culminates in monetary compensation. From our perspective as the prevailing party, this limitation can at times feel like an even higher barrier than state immunity itself. With that in mind, let me turn to Professor Webster. As legal representatives engaged in this legal battle, what more can we actually do? I imagine this is something you have given considerable thought to. Beyond the level of monetary compensation, what other legal efforts might be pursued to achieve a more fundamental resolution of the “Comfort Women” issue, aside from filing lawsuits?

The essence of the “Comfort Women” litigation lies not in enforcement, but in diplomatic resolution

🧶 Timothy Webster : The lawsuits to date have established a factual foundation for the “Comfort Women” issue and have played a crucial role in ensuring it is not forgotten. That said, we must ask: will the Japanese government actually comply with the Seoul High Court’s November 2023 ruling, which accepted the plaintiffs’ claims and recognized Japan’s liability for damages? This is something we need to examine carefully. We might also question whether the Korean government can genuinely act on behalf of the plaintiffs and fully represent their demands. With enforcement now at issue, the problem is that the party subject to enforcement is a sovereign state. In light of this reality, perhaps we should consider pressing the Korean government to seek a better solution with the Japanese government—one that is better than the 2015 Park Geun-hye administration’s solution.

🧶 Ryu Gwang-ok : However, the “Comfort Women” lawsuits differ from ordinary civil litigation. We do not expect the standard sequence of judgment followed by enforcement to unfold in the usual way, nor do we assume full cooperation from either the Korean or Japanese government in that process. What is clear from a historical perspective, however, is that each time a progressive administration has come to power in Korea, there has been incremental progress in addressing the “Comfort Women” issue. For example, under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, it was confirmed that the issue had not been included in the Korea–Japan Claims Settlement Agreement. Under the Moon Jae-in administration, it was recognized that the 2015 Korea–Japan “Comfort Women” Agreement failed to adequately reflect the dignity and human rights of the victims. Although these developments were not directly reflected in court rulings, I believe they nonetheless formed part of the broader context that eventually led to favorable judgments for the plaintiffs. In other words, while it is deeply regrettable that enforcement cannot be expected in the same way as in ordinary civil cases, and that the current administration has shown little willingness to adopt a more forward-looking stance, the progress achieved so far will not simply be disregarded or reversed, as it was under past conservative or authoritarian governments. In that sense, it suggests that progress will continue, in one way or another.

Another point I would like to mention is that the ultimate resolution of the “Comfort Women” litigation lies not in enforcement but in a diplomatic settlement. In effect, such a diplomatic resolution would serve as the practical equivalent of enforcing the judgment, and therefore requires the active involvement of both the Korean and Japanese governments. I believe that this process will, in time, lead to a measure of progress. At the same time, in order to bring about such a diplomatic outcome, our legal team must continue to exert pressure as if we were pursuing enforcement in the ordinary sense—regardless of whether state immunity ultimately applies. In this respect, we find ourselves in a somewhat paradoxical position.

An environment that compelled even an unconventional solution, such as the creation of a fund

🧶 Timothy Webster : As you know, despite the 2018 ruling, Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal (now Nippon Steel) and Mitsubishi declared they would not pay compensation, and in the end, no enforcement actually took place. Then, five years later, during the presidency of former President Yoon Suk Yeol, a solution was introduced— admittedly not an ideal one—to establish a fund within the framework of the Korean legal system. In my view, this measure emerged out of the pressure for enforcement. At the end of 2023, the Seoul High Court ruled that the Japanese government must pay damages, but it likewise seems unlikely that this judgment will actually be enforced. Nevertheless, given the legal obligations at stake, the Korean government will face pressure to pursue enforcement, which may, in turn, serve as a catalyst for reopening negotiations.

🧶 Ryu Gwang-ok : As you know, the reason the previous administration proposed the unusual solution of third-party payment following the ruling in the forced mobilization cases was that compulsory execution was actually underway. Compulsory execution involves identifying the defendant’s assets, seizing them, and proceeding with their sale through auction. Since the plaintiffs had prevailed, these procedures were carried out concretely and without legal issue. However, the very act of enforcing judgments against Japanese companies implicated in war crimes and disposing of their assets risked escalating into a diplomatic dispute. Under those circumstances, the government felt compelled to put forward an unconventional solution in the form of a fund. Concerning the “Comfort Women” issue, however, both the Korean and Japanese governments are well aware that enforcement is difficult due to the state immunity clause. As a result, enforcement proceedings are unlikely to function as an effective source of diplomatic pressure. In that sense, it is hard to expect a diplomatic resolution to emerge from such pressure, and this marks a key difference from the forced mobilization lawsuits. Even so, because the current administration was formed on the foundation of Korea’s long-standing democratization, I do not expect any rollback of the progress achieved thus far.

On the one hand, hearing Chairperson Lee reflect on the significance of the lawsuits brings back memories of 2016, which leaves me feeling both encouraged and somewhat saddened. This is because, when we consider the present moment—whether any meaningful changes have occurred for the surviving victims, or whether the nature of the 2015 Korea–Japan “Comfort Women” Agreement has shifted—it is difficult to say that there has been any substantive progress. In that regard, I would appreciate hearing your assessment, as well as your thoughts on what steps we should take moving forward.

🧶 Lee Na-Young : In the meantime, it is a deeply regrettable reality that, among the plaintiffs in our lawsuits, all but one—Lee Yong-soo—have passed away. Yet, if we take the view that enforcement is not everything, I believe a significant change has occurred. Change can be both positive and negative, but depending on how we interpret it, it also holds the potential to generate new hope. Despite favorable rulings, the Japanese government continues to assert that Korea is “violating international law” and that the issue was already resolved by the 2015 Korea–Japan “Comfort Women” Agreement. In doing so, it once again exposes its outrageousness and its persistent denial and distortion of history. Paradoxically, however, this has also become an opportunity for us to reaffirm our commitment to safeguarding the truth. In that sense, it is serving as a renewed source of momentum for the movement.

Immediately following the successive favorable rulings in the “Comfort Women” cases in Korea, the Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (the Korean Council) held five domestic and international symposiums. These events helped draw international attention to the significance of the rulings, and there have even been instances in which courts in other countries have relied on them. The significance of these judgments was also shared within UN bodies, including the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Reports reaffirming that the 2015 Korea–Japan “Comfort Women” Agreement does not constitute a genuine resolution to the issue have continued to be issued this year, following similar reports last year. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) also assessed that the 2023 Seoul High Court ruling represents progress in international law. In July 2025, seven UN Special Rapporteurs sent letters to both the affected states and Japan, calling on the Japanese government to provide legal reparations and a formal apology, and urging a response. In this way, a virtuous cycle has been sustained: we provide updated information as circumstances evolve, and the international community responds by renewing attention to the issue. At the same time, we have consistently urged the Korean government—through both official and unofficial channels—to pursue enforcement and to continue diplomatic efforts. I believe that this very process of making such demands constitutes a movement and serves to underscore that the “Comfort Women” issue remains unresolved. A quick or superficial settlement cannot be regarded as a fundamental solution.

Let me raise one more issue at a deeper level. One of the major reasons the issue of the Japanese Military “Comfort Women,” as well as the broader questions surrounding Japan’s illegal colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula and its crimes against humanity, remains unresolved is related to the role of the United States. U.S. diplomatic and military strategy, which sought to position Japan and the Korean Peninsula as a bulwark in the Cold War, formed the backdrop to both the 1965 Korea-Japan Claims Settlement Agreement and the 2015 Korea-Japan “Comfort Women” Agreement, and aspects of that dynamic continue to this day. As a result of these geopolitical dynamics, human rights violations committed during the period of Japanese colonial rule have become an issue that extends beyond the bilateral relationship between Korea and Japan. Paradoxically, over time, this process has revealed that the deep-rooted causes of many of these problems lie in the Cold War order and in the enduring legacies of imperialism and colonialism, prompting a deeper recognition of the importance of peace. At the same time, even as resolution has been delayed, the scope and depth of understanding and solidarity have continued to expand. More recently, we have also been reflecting together on how civil society in Korea—and increasingly in Japan as well—should respond to the global backsliding of democracy and human rights and to the rise of the far right.

Embodying the Ethos of the “Comfort Women” Movement through Solidarity in the Post-Victim-Survivor Era

🧶 Ryu Gwang-ok : While our discussion has deepened, given our time constraints, it would be best to shift the conversation toward the directions we should pursue in both the short and long term, as well as the roles each party should play.

🧶 Timothy Webster : You raised the issue of the United States. Indeed, the current situation is so bleak that some have even described it as a "disaster." Regrettably, we may need to temper our expectations of the U.S. government. Even so, we must continue to think carefully about how to carry the “Comfort Women” issue forward. In the 1990s, Japan's Support Group for Lawsuit of Korean Former “Comfort Women” viewed it as a significant challenge to engage people in their 20s and 30s. Above all, we need to pay greater attention to younger generations. For them, these events took place before they were even born. Precisely for that reason, if we hope to encourage their participation in movements and initiatives related to historical issues, we will need to develop more creative approaches.

In this regard, it may be helpful to consider the example of Peipei Qiu, a researcher who develops AI bots that engage with social issues in China. She creates AI bots featuring children’s avatars as the main characters, which convey stories about China’s “Comfort Women” and the government support efforts, while also interacting with users by answering their questions. In this way, we need to find new avenues for sharing these issues by leveraging social media and emerging technologies that are already embedded in young people’s everyday lives. To do so, we must first understand where young people spend their time and what they are doing. For instance, my son spends four to five hours a day on his phone, and most young people today are probably not very different. One possible approach would be to create short, 10-second TikTok videos that communicate key information—for example, summaries of court rulings. More broadly, we need to develop ways to make events from the 1930s and 1940s visible and tangible to younger generations.

🧶 Lee Na-Young : Many survivors of the “Comfort Women” have passed away across the affected countries, including Korea. We have therefore been preparing for what we call the imminent “post-victim-survivor era.” We intentionally use the term "post-victim-survivor" rather than "post-victim" because the notion of victimhood within the “Comfort Women” movement has continued to expand over time. In Korea, many citizens—though not direct victims themselves—have become connected to this history through various forms of engagement in supporting and advocating for survivors, and have come to see the issue as their own. For example, many women in their teens and twenties develop a sense of "involved party’ stance" in the issue through their own experiences of gender discrimination or sexual violence. For that reason, even as the surviving victims pass away, it would be inaccurate to say that we are entering a “post-victim” era.

Even after the survivors have passed away, one of the central commitments of the “Comfort Women” movement has been to ensure that we do not lose this shared sense that so many of us have come to embody. To that end, the movement has continued its legal efforts while steadily expanding solidarity with civil society across a wide range of fields. There are organizations working to uncover the truth about forced mobilization and civilian massacres, groups engaged in anti-war and peace movements, human rights organizations opposing discrimination against sexual minorities, such as the South Korean Coalition for Anti-discrimination Legislation, and groups confronting violence against women. We have stood, and will continue to stand, in solidarity with these groups, all of which share a common commitment to justice, truth, human rights, and peace. The same holds true for our engagement in international human rights and transnational solidarity efforts. The Korean Council has also spoken out against the killing of Palestinian civilians and operates the Palestine Women Trauma Healing Center locally to support victims. This is because the current situation in Palestine is not entirely separate from the historical “Comfort Women” issue.

🧶 Ryu Gwang-ok : We have had a wide-ranging discussion, covering issues from legal proceedings to engagement with future generations, resistance to ongoing violence, and participation in the international human rights and peace movement. While many topics deserve deeper discussion regarding the “Comfort Women” movement and the related legal actions, we would like to bring today's discussion to a close with a shared commitment to continue taking steps toward a more just future. Thank you all for joining us.